Chapters

Provisioning with food and energy, the so-called “Approvisionierung”, was the Achilles heel of the city in the dramatic years 1914 to 1918. Vienna was condemned to suffer hunger and cold. The picture of hundreds of thousands queuing became the symbol of the age.

Society was programmed to expect a short campaign but not an enduring war. The social agenda became more and more urgent. The war marked the dawn of the modern social state.

Astonishing but imperative as a consequence of the war: the Christian Social municipal government had to assert tenancy protection against its own clientele, the house owners. Tenancy protection was not the only social achievement to be continued by “Das Rote Wien” – Red Vienna.

Starting the war was easy. But ending the war seemed to be an impossibility. The population no longer wished to hear anything about the war after the “Swedish Turnip Winter” of 1916/17. The Imperial Capital and Residence sank into a vortex of apathy and aggression, dirt and social ignominy.

Did the Great Powers ‘stumble’ into the First World War, as is often claimed? Or were there powerful ‘material’ interests behind the official political rhetoric that made the war appear desirable?

In the opinion of Rudolf Sieghart, the governor of one of the largest and most influential Viennese banks before 1914, the Boden-Credit-Anstalt, it was the folly of the erstwhile rulers that led directly into the war. The Boden-Credit-Anstalt was regarded as the bank that was particularly close to the Imperial house.

As in most of the colonies that Germany, Austria Hungary's ally, had occupied before the First World War, there was, to put it bluntly, little to be obtained commercially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From an economic point of point of view, how much sense did such conquests make? Did commercial considerations play any major role at all in connection with the outbreak of war?

In economic terms, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not prepared for a long and major war. It was above all the illusion as to the duration of the war that prevented a comprehensive economic ‘rearmament’.

Large empires such as Austria-Hungary, which had been at an advantage in the armed disputes of the 19th century because of their large populations, proved in the First World War to be incapable of bearing the burdens of modern war because of their weak economic basis.

Despite all the problems, the production of armaments in the Austro-Hungarian Empire reached its peak in 1916 and 1917. The decline in production in the last year of the war was all the more dramatic. At the same time, social disputes intensified.

An ‘industrial war’ lasting for years changes the structure of an economy, because it leads to the expansion of heavy industry, which in turn gives rise to problems in the peace economy after the war.

As the war progressed, the enthusiasm for it was replaced by revolutionary dissatisfaction; the composition of the workforce also changed.

It was only in the course of the war that specific types of aeroplane for specific forms of aerial warfare began to appear. What remained in people’s memory was above all the fighter planes and the aerial combat of the ‘flying aces’, who were also instrumentalized by wartime propaganda, which presented them as heroes.

In the years before the First World War Austria-Hungary lagged behind the industrialized states of Western Europe as regards both economic performance and military expenditure. As a result the new field of military aviation had very modest funds at its disposal. However, the gradual development of the air force took place in a way that was similar to that in other states.

Before the First World War approximately half a dozen companies tried to set up in aircraft manufacture, but they all had to give up.

As a result of technical and budget problems the aviation corps had an urgent need for new aircraft when the war began. The aging Pfeilflieger and Etrich Taube had to be replaced by more modern aircraft, with aircraft technology developing at a rapid pace.

In view of the precarious state of the Aviation Corps’ equipment, from 1915 it was decided to take sweeping measures to ensure the supply of aeroplanes. Particular importance was given to the ‘Knoller Programme’.

The failure of each of the three phases of the Knoller Programme was followed by decisions in favour of alternatives in order to acquire the urgently required aircraft suited for war service from other sources. The aircraft that became the type flown most by the Imperial and Royal Aviation Corps was the Hansa-Brandenburg C I two-seater biplane.

The first successful powered flight had taken place just eleven years before the First World War. The entire industry was still in a tumultuous phase of development during which numerous companies were competing with one another to come up with innovations.

The Habsburg Monarchy was in no way prepared for the provision of the many war invalids. A practically impenetrable jungle of improvised measures lasting until the end of the war proved hardly adequate to regulate this agenda.

The many welfare measures organised with good intentions by private associations to help war invalids and war widows were more propagandist than of real value.

After being wounded, the soldiers now had to endure what were frequently months of roaming from one hospital to another in the hinterland. Many of these facilities could make no more than provisional arrangements to care for the invalids.

For the first time during the First World War it became clear that specific measures had to be taken to reintegrate draftee war invalids into employment again. This gave rise to the idea of training invalids.

Helping war invalids to become employable again was not enough. Hence action was taken already during the war in order to re-integrate them in practice into the work process.